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Abstract
Political competition is the engine for representative democracy. Within the repre-
sentation mechanics I look at the political space, the dimensionality of political conflict,
and how parties try to affect the relative salience of different dimensions by using direct
democratic institutions. The leading question is how we can explain initiative use. The
paper asks how the costs and benefits of using initiatives affect parties when they decide
whether to use this instrument or not. The major argument is that when party compe-
tition increases, we will see higher initiative frequencies because parties try to affect the
saliency of specific issues to increase their electoral bases. I analyze annual submission
rates, the content of proposed initiatives, and the changing share of partisan actors behind
initiatives. The findings highlight that the consequences of direct democratic institutions
go beyond changing policy outcomes. For the specific case at hand, Switzerland from 1920
to 2011, it is shown that despite numerous opposite claims, there has been no underlying
change in strategy or equilibrium but just a slow evolution of underlying factors such as
institutional requirements and partisan competition.
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1 Introduction
One of the visible changes in Swiss democratic practice over the last thirty years has been
the increased use of direct democratic institutions. This paper focuses on one form of direct
democratic institutions and asks how we can explain the frequency of initiatives. The main
argument is that parties use the initiative to change the relative saliency of issues in pursuit
of their electoral goals.
Direct democracy is an institution to which many effects have been ascribed and a large
body of literature describes how direct democracy affects various outcomes. Prominent ex-
amples are the effect on political knowledge (e.g., Smith and Tolbert, 2004), the moderating
effect on taxes and expenditures (e.g., Matsusaka, 2004), a potentially positive effect on policy
congruence (Leemann and Wasserfallen, 2015), and how direct democracy limits legislators
from pursuing overly extreme goals (e.g., Neidhart, 1970; Gerber, 1996). Unlike these classic
studies, the present paper does not focus on the relationship between direct democratic insti-
tutions and a specific policy outcome but rather looks at how the presence of direct democracy
may alter and change processes within the representative system. In doing so, it responds
to a claim by Hug (2009) that there is little literature that “[h]as addressed the issue how
referendums affect the representative governments that prevail in all democratic states around
the world” (2009: 252). This paper describes how direct democratic institutions also affect
what is debated. By doing so it does not focus on policy effects but rather shows the systemic
consequences of direct democratic institutions.
To evaluate the argument I rely on the national occurrence of direct democratic initiatives
in Switzerland since 1920. The Swiss case is exceptionally well suited, as it is one of the few
cases where citizens and civil society groups have the right to collect signatures and propose
changes on the national level. While many other entities know the initiative process (e.g.
half of all US states and German La¨nder), the Swiss case combines a national party system
with direct democracy on a national level. Since the argument hinges on the structure of
the multidimensional political space and on partisan actors, it is crucial to have a case where
direct democracy exists at the same level as that in which political space is created and
maintained as well as where the party system constitutes itself. The initiative in Switzerland
has experienced increased popularity and is being used more and more. By relying on the
theoretical argument, this paper is capable of explaining the varying use.
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Empirically, I show how increased partisan competition, via changes of the multidimen-
sional policy space, fueled the use of the initiative during the last 100 years in Switzerland.
This analysis deepens our understanding of party competition under direct democracy and is
also capable of explaining the frequency of initiatives. Finally, while a considerable amount
of the literature regards direct democratic institutions as beneficial for parties (e.g., Gruner,
1977; Scarrow, 1997), and another highlights potential deficiencies (e.g., Phillips, 2008), this
contribution rather shows which parties may gain and which may lose and how debates and
conflicts are changed in the presence of direct democracy.
The next section of the paper presents a univariate analysis looking at how the usage of
the initiative has changed during the last century. Section 3 outlines the theoretical argument
that increased party competition leads to an increased usage of the initiative. In section 4,
I present an empirical test of the main argument and also supply empirical evidence for two
theoretical implications. Section 5 provides an outlook, built on the results presented, and I
argue that we will likely keep seeing rather higher levels of initiative usage.
2 A First Glimpse: Swiss Initiatives from 1920 to 2011
Since 1891, when the initiative was introduced, any Swiss citizen (before 1971 only men) has
been allowed to propose a change to the constitution. If a sufficient number of signatures is
collected, the proposed change is put to a vote. Up until 1977 it sufficed to collect 50,000
signatures, and thereafter 100,000 signatures. In principle, any group of citizens can propose a
change to the constitution, and there are examples of successful use where no political party or
organization supported the initial steps (e.g. the initiative proposed by parents and relatives
of a young girl who was the victim of a sex crime, Verwahrungsinitiative 2004).
The use of the initiative at the national level in Switzerland has witnessed different periods
of ebb and flow. Nowadays politicians and other public actors express the opinion on a
somewhat regular basis that direct democratic institutions are being over -used. This is not
a unique or new phenomenon. In every annual report of the Anne´e Politique from the 1970s
there exists references to debates that the usage of initiatives and referendums was perceived
to be too high and there were discussions on how to change that (APS, 1970, 1972, 1973,
1974, 1975, 1976, 1977). There is a notion that the institution is being abused (e.g., Senti,
3
2013) and there are attempts, by politicians and lobbyists, to change the rules governing the
direct democratic institutions.1
Before I present the theoretical argument and empirical analysis supporting it, I first want
to turn attention to the usage of the initiative over the last 100 years. The purpose of this
exercise is to take a close look at the actual usage and see if there are major changes over the
last century. I will rely on a Bayesian change point model which enables the identification, in
an objective way, of different periods of initiative usage (Park, 2010). The different periods
are identified by estimating the probability that one period ends and a new period starts in
any given year.
The Bayesian change point model allows us to describe the probability that the underlying
data generating process changes based on the parameter estimates. In this case the model
is based on a Poisson process, which is suitable for a count variable. The Bayesian change
point model is an extension in which one can estimate, for example, a Poisson model with
a structural break creating two different data generating processes, each for a different time
period. Several different models can the be estimated that only differ in the number of
structural breaks they incorporate (Gill, 2007). Finally, the model with the highest data
fit will yield a disciplined and data-driven answer to the question of whether there are any
structural breaks in the data and if so, when they most likely occurred.
Comparing the Bayes factors of each model allows adjudication between the different
models. The Bayes factor is the ratio of probabilities that a specific model produced the
observed data. Technical details for this analysis are provided in the appendix (see online
appendix A1). For the five models (no change, one change, two changes, three changes, and
four changes) the estimated results indicate that the two-break model fits the data best, closely
followed by that with one structural break. The two-break model indicates that there is an
early regime that lasts until the mid-1920s. After that there is an almost 50-year period for
the second regime, and finally in the late 1960s there is the onset of a third regime lasting
until 2011. While the first regime has on average 2.4 initiatives per year, there is a clear drop
to about 0.8 for the second regime, and a steep increase to 3.2 in the third regime. The first
period, up until 1925, is very short, and the remaining almost 90 years can be understood as
two periods. Hence, we will focus on the big structural break in the late 1960s.
1More than 20% of the members of the lower house (Nationalrat) have demanded that the government
evaluates measures to limit the number of initiatives (Friedli, 2013).
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Figure 1: Change Point Model: National Initiatives 1920-2011
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Notes: The dots in the top panel show the number of initiatives submitted in a given year. The
various lines show different locally weighted polynomial regression lines. The lower panel shows
the probability of a regime transition in a given year. Data is based on all submitted initiatives.
Figure 1 shows the frequency of initiatives and the estimation results from the model with
two regime changes (or structural breaks). The upper panel shows the raw data as well as the
superimposed lowess functions. Because the lowess function is somewhat sensitive to the exact
smoothing parameter, I draw thin lines for a wide range of smoothing parameters (Cleveland,
1979). The lower panel shows transition probabilities indicating the two structural breaks
in the 1920s and the late 1960s. The first and second regime are not very different, which
coincides with the results from the model comparison (the one-break model without the first
break is almost as good as this two-break model) as well as the average number of submitted
initiatives. The two structural breaks coincide with larger political phases, such as the post-
WWI period, when many fundamental institutional changes were implemented.2 The second
structural break around 1970 coincides with a number of different processes. Kriesi et al.
(2006), for example, mention five different changes: secularization, value change, increased
education, increased wealth, and sectoral change which fundamentally affect and alter the
political conflict. From a macro-historical perspective these structural breaks are clear and
explicable.
2In 1919 Switzerland used for the first time a system of proportional representation to elect the lower house.
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The initiative is used regularly up to 1970, at which point there is a clear shift and
parties start using it to catch “political attention” (“politische Aufmerksamkeit”; Senti, 2013).
Contrary to this result, I will argue in the remainder of the paper that there was not a sudden
shift of strategies or a breakdown in cooperation that led actors to pursue different strategies
leading to a new equilibrium. I argue that there was an increase in the use of initiatives
that occured gradually and was predictable. Rather than actors changing their strategies, I
show how the circumstances changed and eventually as a consequence there was an increase
in initiative use. The next section lays out the theoretical argument of this paper.
3 Dimensionality of Politics - Politics of Dimensionality
The idea of describing political conflict with reference to a spatial model is almost as old
as democratic thought. Possibly the earliest reference to a spatial model of political com-
petition is found in works from Aristotle assuming that the worldviews of citizens can be
aligned along one dimension, and “[t]his dimension is wealth or class” (Hinich and Munger,
1997, 22). A frequent description of the political space in Western Europe is that it can be
described by two dimensions: the first accounts for the distributional conflict, and the sec-
ond represents cultural issues (Kriesi et al., 2008; Marks et al., 2006).3 The precise meaning
of the second dimension varies and has been described as the conflict between materialistic
and post-materialistic values (Ingelhart, 1977), the tension between authoritarian and liber-
tarian positions (Kitschelt, 1994), and the conflict between green-alternative-libertarian and
traditional-authoritarian-nationalist positions (Marks et al., 2006).
The structure of the political space can be altered over time as well as the content of the
second dimension. Bornschier (2015, this issue) shows convincingly how for Switzerland the
meaning of the second dimension changes over time. While originally the second dimension
mostly mirrored the religious divide, it transformed and became more closely associated with
the conflict between libertarian and traditional positions. At first it was the new Left that
increased the second dimension’s salience, but the reaction followed no later than in the 1990s
from the Right and is closely linked to Switzerland’s relationship with the European Union
and immigration (Bornschier, 2015, p. 4).
3Note that Bakker et al. (2012) find three distinct dimensions, where questions pertaining to the European
Union constitute a distinct dimension.
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3.1 Political Parties and Political Dimensions
Political parties can be separated by positioning them along an axis representing the different
meaningful positions that can be taken on an issue. The familiar left/right dimension car-
ries a lot of meaning, and even without knowing a country, one immediately forms specific
expectations when a party is labeled as left or right. A left-wing party is expected to be
more in favor of economic redistribution and often also more universalistic than the right-
win party. Hence, the left/right continuum is somewhat of a super-issue (Gabel and Huber,
2000). A more nuanced description may rely on a two-dimensional space with a distributional
conflict (first dimension) and an additional axis that is partly independent from the first and
is about identity politics, environmental politics, and individual freedoms (second dimension).
Lachat (2009) provides an analysis that relies on a two-dimensional model but shows that
citizens tend to be placed on a curve. One particular insight is that center-left voters hold
mostly similar views on the cultural dimension but different views on redistributive questions.
Center-right voters, on the other hand, hold similar points of view on economic questions,
while they diverge on cultural questions. This creates different incentives for different parties
regarding which issues to raise and how to affect the saliency of the two dimensions.
Where does this second dimension come from, and how do new issues enter the system?
De Vries and Marks (2012) distinguish two different general approaches; the sociological and
the strategic approach. Sociological explanations assume that dimensions exist independent
of parties and that they are rather forced on the parties. The strategic viewpoint, on the
other hand, tends to think of parties forcing new issue and dimensions into the political
system. One way to distinguish these two different conceptions of the emergence of new
dimensions is that if one models parties and their actions on the sociological perspective, new
dimensions emerge exogenously, while for the strategic account the dimension is a consequence
of intentional action. Both accounts agree that political parties may compete over more than
one dimension, but they differ on how these dimensions enter into existence.
In the previously mentioned work by Kriesi et al. (2008), it is globalization that causes
the underlying economic and sociological structure to change. A consequence of this change
is the emergence of new issues that may be folded into the second dimension. This creates
incentives for parties to campaign on new issues, and in this way the new issue enters into
the political debate. The social choice literature provides the concept of heresthetics which
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accounts for the strategic manipulation of the dimensions (Riker, 1990). Political actors are
assumed to emphasize a specific issue or dimension if they expect to be more competitive
on that dimension. An established party that has an unfavorable position on a new issue
will try to protect the current structure and can either remain unclear about its position or
try to prevent the new issue from arising and becoming aligned with the second dimension.
The former strategy, taking an unclear position, is sometimes referred to as position blurring
(Rovny, 2012). Newer parties in particular may be interested in raising and introducing
a new issue. The faith of newer groups in representative systems hinges on the response
of established groups (Hug, 2001; Meguid, 2005). But if direct democratic institutions are
available, established parties are taken the option of dismissing an issue entirely. This is one
way by which direct democracy may alter contestation.
3.2 Direct Democracy and the Dimensionality of Politics
Initiatives provide political actors with a strong instrument to affect the public debate. Any
group, capable of collecting a sufficient number of signatures, can force a plebiscite on a
constitutional amendment. This gives groups, especially smaller and newer groups, a dispro-
portionally strong influence to introduce new topics to public political debate. Established
groups, on the other hand, can rely on initiatives to affect the relative saliency of a dimension.
It has long been recognized that the initiative offers unique opportunities to political actors
(parties or associations) to introduce a new issue into the political arena and/or to claim topic
leadership (see e.g. Gruner, 1978). Parties can use the initiative to alter the political debate
in their favor in general, and this is not restricted to smaller or newer parties.
The initiative allows a party to distinguish itself from competitors. The initiative is
uniquely well-suited, as the proposer can freely choose the topic to be proposed. This allows
parties to select issues on which their own electorate is fairly homogenous but the electorate
of competitors is split (Budge et al., 1987; Smith and Tolbert, 2004). Further, by deciding
how extreme a proposal is, the party can construct an ideal conflict. Choosing wedge is-
sues will force the competitor to take a position that comes with an electoral cost. Another
potential incentive is that an actor can change the salience of issues and emphasize policy
areas on which the actor expects to be judged as more competent than the other compet-
ing parties (Nicholson, 2005). It might be a prime example of heresthetics and corresponds
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nicely to the description by Riker (1990) that “Heresthetics has to do with changing the space
or constraints on the voters in such a way that they are encouraged, even driven, to move
themselves to the advantage of the heresthetician” (1990: 47). Following the description of
voter positions in the late 1990s and 2000s by Lachat (2009) and Leimgruber et al. (2010)
– that center-left voters vary on the first dimension and that center-right voters vary on the
second – expectations about party competition can be formulated. Parties tapping into the
center-left voter base will differentiate each other on economic issues. We would expect to
see, for example, Social Democrats proposing initiatives which touch on the redistributive
dimension to win over left-leaning voters of the center parties. Similarly, we would expect
that parties competing over center-right voters will differentiate each other on the second
dimension. The Swiss People’s Party regularly launches initiatives on immigration issues and
questions pertaining to the relationship with Europe. By doing so, the Swiss People’s Party
has successfully attracted former liberal and conservative voters that take a more conservative
stance on these issues. This serves to illustrate that parties can strategically use initiatives to
affect salience and attract voters from other parties.
A direct implication of this is that the initiative may be beneficial to the proposer even
when there is eventually no change in policy. One problem for formal theories of the initiative
is that they struggle to explain why one observes initiatives even when there is little to no hope
that the measure would achieve popular approval.4 After all, the costly action would only
be beneficial if the policy were eventually changed. But taking into account that proposers
might use the initiative not to affect policy directly but rather to change public discourse and
campaign for the upcoming elections provides an argument that rests on the assumption that
the costs of using the initiative – understood as net gain/loss apart from the actual policy –
might also be negative and hence the campaign itself the goal. Simply put, political parties
may use the initiative not because they expect to change policy outcomes directly (i.e. the
initiative reaches a popular majority and a majority in half the cantons and is hence passed)
but as a means to take a political position in a very visible way and to campaign.
4Since 1891 only 19 out of 182 initiatives have been accepted. Sometimes the government pitches a counter-
proposal against the citizen’s proposal. Taking this into account there are still less than one in four attempts
where policy outcomes are changed successfully (see also Rohner, 2012).
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3.3 Explaining Initiative Frequency
Initiative frequency cannot be explained solely by partisan behavior. But I argue here that a
large part of the variation in initiative usage can be explained by focusing on the incentives
faced by parties. Parties use initiatives strategically. When using an initiative promises more
benefits, a party becomes more likely to use the initiative. When the costs of using an initiative
are lower, parties would rather rely on this instrument.
Benefits are higher when economic and sociological changes create new potential dimen-
sions of political conflict. There will be political actors who benefit from increasing the salience
of these new dimensions of conflict. Direct democratic institutions allow parties to circumvent
the classic law-making process and present a measure directly to the people via the ballot,
thereby attracting voters from other parties and redirecting attention to these newer issues.
This will provide more electoral gains when the voter-party relationship is out of equilibrium,
e.g. when voters agree with their preferred party on one dimension but not necessarily on the
other.
New issues or rapidly changing issue salience can erode an equilibrium and lead to height-
ened party competition. Bartolini (1999, 2000) defines four distinct dimensions of political
competition, and the argument at hand is most closely related to what he termed “availabil-
ity” and “vulnerability”. Availability requires that voters actually will switch their vote or
party attachment. Vulnerability, on the other hand, focuses on the incumbents actually being
threatened. Changing issue salience or new emerging issues impact on both these dimensions
– making voters more likely to switch and also potentially hurting parties that have a base
that is split on these new questions.
Following the above argument, two predictions can be derived. First, the increase in po-
litical competition among parties should lead to an increased frequency of initiatives. Parties
will try to increase salience by using the initiative on issues that benefit them. The second
implication pertains to the content of the proposed initiatives. If the competition is driving
initiative usage, we expect to see many initiatives being submitted that pertain to the second
dimension because its meaning is in flux, and parties will try to emphasize issues as they arise
to benefit from altered content of the second dimension.
A final benefit for parties is found in connecting the electoral campaign with the process of
signature collection. This allows parties to mobilize its base for a cause and also to signal to
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voters that the party is actively trying to correct a perceived wrong. If partisan calculation can
explain initiative frequency, we should see more initiatives being submitted closer to elections.
Initiatives are more likely when the cost of launching them is lower. The costs to launch an
initiative are the resources needed to collect the necessary signatures to overcome the thresh-
old (Hug, 2004). Switzerland knows an absolute threshold (50,000 until 1977 and 100,000
thereafter), but the size of the voting-eligible population has changed dramatically over time.
A larger population means potentially more people collecting signatures and more people to
collect them from. The share of required signatures of the total eligible population is a stan-
dard measure of how easy or hard the access to direct democratic institutions is (Stutzer,
1999). Eder et al. (2009) find in a cross-sectional design for German La¨nder a clear relation-
ship between signature requirements and usage. For U.S. states, (Matsusaka, 1995, p.592) has
shown the relationship between signature requirements and number of initiatives. Barankay
et al. (2003) present mixed results depending on the exact model specification and institution
they look at. I will return to the question whether signature requirements and changes thereof
could affect the number of submitted initiatives in subsection 5.1.
To sum up, the consequences of increased partisan competition is that we see the frequency
of initiatives increase. The initiative has given marginalized groups a potential entry into the
political debate. Social movements have used the initiative as well as newer parties to walk
onto the political stage (Kriesi, 1998). But the above argument lays out why also established
parties have an incentive to use this institution. If the argument holds, we should observe
that most of these initiatives pertain to issues of the substantively fluid second dimension.
4 Empirical Assessment
This section presents three different analyses. First, I present a regression-based model which
allows me to illustrate the explanatory strength of different factors that contribute to initia-
tive frequency. I show that partisan competition, institutional requirements, and proximity
to the next election are powerful predictors of initiative frequency. These results are not
strictly causal but only correlational in nature. To further strengthen the empirical case for
the argument, I test two implications of the main theoretical claim. If parties exploit the
emergence of new issues to submit initiatives, we should see that they pertain to these new
issues. We should also see that the share of second-dimension initiatives increases with the
11
post-material wave toward the end of the 1960s. The second implication is that a large share
of initiatives should be of partisan origin rather than being submitted by civil society groups.
Again, politicians should be especially dominant from the end of the 1960s on.
My strategy is as follows: I first show that partisan competition drives initiative usage.
After establishing correlational association, I show that two implications of the argument are
empirically supported. First, the majority of initiatives submitted in the boom period touch
on issues pertaining to the second dimension. Second, the increase in initiative usage can
be mostly attributed to politicians and political parties rather than an increased involvement
of civil society groups. Taken all together, this section provides empirical support for the
argument.
The analysis in this section is based on all initiatives submitted between 1920 and 2011.
The starting point, 1920, is given by a constraint on the measure of electoral competition – only
after the change of the electoral system to proportional representation can we compare all years
on that variable. The dataset ends in 2011, ensuring that we can distinguish between initiatives
that were eventually voted on and those that have been pulled back. The dataset covers 274
initiatives, of which 176 were put up for a vote – the basis of the data is a comprehensive
collection by the Anne´e Politique Suisse (APS, 2013).5 The outcome variable is the number
of national initiatives submitted per given year. The main variables used in this section are
the degree of electoral competition, the signature requirements, and proximity to the next
election. The next section presents the operationalization and analysis.
4.1 Analyzing Initiative Frequency
There are two main factors that can explain the frequency of initiatives on a national level. On
the one hand, the institutional rules affect how costly it is for an actor to submit an initiative.
First and foremost, the number of signatures required affects these costs. The second aspect is
the degree or extent of partisan competition. The higher the competition, the more parties are
inclined to try to win over supporters of another party or to try to reinforce the attachment
of existing voters. Finally, I also use proximity to the next election to control for electoral
cycle effects.
5In addition, information on content and proposers was collected from the official records of the Federal
Statistical Office and the Federal Chancellery.
12
Electoral Competition: As political issues, which do not align well on the first di-
mension, enter the political arena, political opportunities emerge. Fundamental changes to
the multidimensional structure of political competition create additional incentives for some
parties or interest groups to submit initiatives. In times of heightened political competition,
parties will struggle more over issue and dimension saliency. To measure political competition,
I rely on electoral volatility in the previous election. The main operationalization is the sum
of absolute changes on the cantonal level of party vote in the last national elections. The
dataset covers the period immediately after the introduction of proportional representation.6
When voters are less attached to parties and change more frequently, we will see higher levels
of electoral volatility. Periods marked by higher volatility increase the potential gains for
parties occupying new issues or positions.
A second variable related to electoral competition is the proximity to next election. Launch-
ing an initiative requires the party to collect signatures, which helps to mobilize its base as
well to connect the signature collection with the electoral campaign. This business-cycle argu-
ment can be understood as an extension of the electoral competition argument above. Parties
are more likely to submit initiatives leading up to elections. To take this into account, I will
code election years as well as pre-election years and expect that more initiatives are submitted
leading up to an election.
Institutional Requirements: Analyzing the use of initiatives also requires taking into
account any potential institutional changes that occurred during the last one hundred years.
The most relevant cost incurred by actors when submitting proposals is the requirement to
gather a significant number of signatures (Matsusaka, 1995). Up until 1977 the constitution
required 50,000 signatures for an initiative to be submitted. As a consequence of the intro-
duction of women’s suffrage (1971), the signature requirement was adjusted in 1977 such that
now initiatives have to gather the support of 100,000 citizens. Nevertheless, the requirement
is formulated as a fixed number of signatures rather than a constant share of the citizenry.7 In
1891, right after the introduction of the initiative at the national level, the requirement meant
obtaining signatures from 7.6% of all voting-eligible citizens. Some eighty years later, in 1977,
6Covering the period prior to the introduction of proportional representation would lead to the problem of
changes in party shares before and after not being comparable, and hence I restrict myself here to the period
for which I can rely on a consistent measure of volatility.
7The state of California, for example, requires 5% of the total vote cast in the last gubernatorial election
(see California Constitution, art. II, § 8(b), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/.const/.article_2).
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this was almost three times less, as 50,000 signatures only amounted to roughly 2.5% (Degen,
2013). And even the change of formal institutions, the increase to 100,000 signatures, only
raised the requirement back to the level it had been, six years earlier, right before women’s
suffrage was introduced. Nowadays 100,000 signatures is less than 2% of the voting-eligible
population. This steady decrease is a central factor in how easy or hard it is to submit an
initiative.
Table 1 shows the estimation results for five different negative binomial regression models.8
The two main variables are electoral competition and signature requirement. Apart from these
two variables, there are additional models with alternative specifications, including indicator
variables for election years and pre-election years.
Table 1: Competition and Signature Effects
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
Electoral Competition 0.43∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗ 0.22∗∗ 0.22∗∗
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Signature Requirements −0.55∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗ −0.42∗∗∗ −0.43∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Election Year 0.29∗ 0.40∗∗
(0.16) (0.17)
Pre-Election Year 0.29∗
(0.18)
Constant 1.00∗∗∗ 0.95∗∗∗ 0.94∗∗∗ 0.85∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.12)
McFadden R2 0.20 0.30 0.34 0.36 0.38
N 92 92 92 92 92
LR test 26.79 46.83 56.20 62.12 65.41
p 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Outcome variable: Number of Initiatives submitted in year j. Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.1,
** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; Negative binomial model. All variables (except dummies) are standardized.
“LR test” stands for likelihood ratio test.
In all model specifications there is a negative and significant effect for the signature require-
ments. As the requirement is lower in terms of the percentage of the voting-eligible population,
the number of submitted initiatives increases. Electoral competition is itself positively related
to the frequency of initiatives. Finally, more initiatives are submitted in election years than
three or four years before an election. But there is no significant difference for election and
pre-election years.9 These results are in line with the argument that partisan behavior can
explain variation in initiative frequency.
To verify how robust the estimation results are, I provide an additional sets of models.
The outcome variable, that is, the number of submitted initiatives, is replaced by the number
8There is no correction for serially-correlated errors since a regression of Pearson residuals on lagged values
reveals that they are not correlated.
9Based on Model 5, it is possible to test whether the two coefficients, βˆelection and βˆpre.election, are different.
The difference is not significant (test statistic is 0.56 and the p−value is 0.58).
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of submitted initiatives that were eventually put on the ballot. The reason for doing so is
that part of the initiatives are being submitted not with the intention to put them to a vote
but rather to pressure the legislature. It is hard, based on these purely quantitative measures,
to distinguish which initiatives served the purpose of strengthening a negotiation position in
the parliament and which did not. Initiatives, which are used to strengthen a negotiation
position, are usually submitted and once the legislature adopts a bill that is sufficiently closer
to the desired outcome (closer than it would have been without a threat via an initiative), the
proposers usually pull back the initiative and it is not brought to a vote.10 The estimation
results illustrate the the robustness of the findings (online appendix, A2, Table 3). The only
substantive change to the results in Table 1 is that the estimate for pre-election years is not
statistically significant anymore. Electoral competition, signature requirements, and election
years remain significant.
The measure for electoral competition is based on cantonal electoral returns. I also con-
structed the same measure but based on the electoral returns at the national level. The
estimation results again remain unchanged with the exception of the estimate for pre-election
years, which is not statistically significant (see online appendix, A2). Finally, I also lagged
the electoral competition variable even further. The electoral competition variable shows the
volatility in the last election. I lag this variable further, by an additional electoral cycle, and
use the results from the elections prior to the preceding national election. The results are in
line with Table 1, and all four variables are statistically significant (see online appendix, A2
and A3). All these alternative specifications serve to show that the results do not depend on
narrow operationalization decisions.
The more relevant concern is the direction of the causal arrow between party competition
and direct democracy usage. After all, increased use of the initiative should also increase
competition. Hence, the results in Table 1 could be biased due to endogeneity. One way to
address this issue is to rely on even further lagged values of competition to predict future
number of submitted initiatives (see above). It is potentially of interest to test any additional
implications of the argument instead. While the first dimension (economic distribution) re-
10Article 73.1 of the Federal Act on Political Rights grants any committee proposing an initiative to withdraw
said initiative up until the parliament fixes a voting date. One of the earlier examples of this mechanism is
found in the initiative seeking to abolish any separate judiciary powers within the army. The government
started to reform the law only months before the Social Democrats submitted 119,000 valid signatures, which
they started to collect clearly before the reform was initiated (Sigg, 1978, p.122). But in this case the initiative
was not pulled back, and this highlights that there is no easy way of adjudicating between motivations.
15
mained constant in substantive terms, the second changes over time (see Bornschier, 2015, this
issue). If initiatives are often submitted to affect the relative salience of issues and for parties
to signal topic leadership, we would expect to see most initiatives touching on the second
dimension of the political space. In the next section I analyze the content of the initiatives.
4.2 Empirical Implications I: Content of Initiatives
The results so far show that initiatives become more frequent when the cost of launching them
decreases and when politicians and political parties can use them to position themselves.
Hence, initiatives are used more frequently in election years, and as political competition
tightens, the number of initiatives goes up. The statistical results reported so far support
all these statements. The argument also has two more qualitative implications that we can
evaluate. One looming question is whether these results support the main argument of the
paper with regard to dimensionality. After all, in the age of mass parties and constant
campaigns, one might expect such a pattern irrespective of the dimensionality of conflict
(Swanson and Mancini, 1996; Norris, 2000). To strengthen the argument that it is the second
dimension that drives the competition and thereby the frequency of initiative, it is necessary
to look at the substance of the ballot proposals. The new emerging issues are expected to
pertain to identity, immigration policies, environmental questions, and post-material values.
What issues do the submitted initiatives touch on? Is there, as argued, a rise in second-
dimension issues such as environmental issues and universal rights? To answer these questions,
I analyze all initiatives which were subject to a vote between 1920 and 2011. Within this period
of almost 100 years there were 176 votes. I coded each vote according to its content and the
debate it inspired as a first-dimension issue (distributional conflict), a second-dimension issue
(identity and moral conflict), or an institutional question.
Distributional conflicts (economic questions) are coded as first-dimension, while questions
pertaining to environment, culture, and immigration are coded as second-dimension votes.
One immediate question is whether it is possible to think of conflict dimensionality as some-
thing stable that has not changed over the last 100 years. While I do make this assumption
here, I believe that it is not generally the case, but that it holds for the period from 1920 to
2011. The first claim is that the economic dimension was already the main line of conflict
in 1920. While it is true that there were still some discussions that were a product of the
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Kulturkampf, the tension had mostly disappeared. After all, it was in 1920 that the Swiss
government allowed the Vatican to reinstall the apostolic nunciature (Jost, 2006, p.759). In
1919 the largest strike in Swiss history, the Landesstreik, pitched young army recruits vis-a`-vis
workers in a number of cities (Maissen, 2010). The time between 1920 and 1930 was marked
by the highest frequency of strike in Swiss history.11 Initiatives that touched on moral issues
or were based on clashing identities, such as the role of Switzerland in Europe (see also Jenni,
2015, in this issue), are coded as second-dimension or cultural issues.
To code the initiatives, I started with the encyclopedic contribution of Linder et al. (2010)
which provides a summary of the emergence, campaign, and outcome of the vote. In addition
to other sources that were relevant for one or two votes, the book by Sigg (1978) provided
detailed information on many votes from the first half. One problem that occurred was that
there were votes that sought to change the institutional order. While some were broad changes
such as the introduction of proportional representation and served not a specific policy goal
but rather a general political goal, there are also other questions. A vibrant issue seems to
be the construction of hydroelectric power stations. An initiative in 1956 attempted to make
it mandatory for the national parliament to explicitly give permission for new hydroelectric
projects rather than the executive. While this was an institutional change, it was made with
the pure intention of making it harder to build hydroelectric power stations, and thus it is
coded as an environmental issue (second dimension). When in doubt, I also looked at who was
submitting initiatives. An example of how this helped to categorize an initiative is from 1993,
when the people voted on whether a national holiday should be an official, and hence paid,
holiday. This could be an economic issue, as it gives all employees an additional day of paid
vacation, or a second-dimension question. Given that it was proposed by a small right-wing
party (Schweizer Demokraten), it is coded as second dimension.
Figure 2 shows the number of submitted initiatives for each year for first- and second-
dimension issues. The dots in the background show the actual counts, and the lines present
different lowess functions. It is striking how constant the number of economic initiatives is;
on average there is slightly less than one per year. The second dimension – comprising mostly
environmental, immigration, and foreign policy questions – is less important up until the
11Strike data is based on BfS (http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/03/05/blank/
data/00.html) as well as Ritzmann (1996), see also http://www.fsw.uzh.ch/histstat/main.php.
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Figure 2: Primary and Secondary Conflict in National Initiatives 1920-2011
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Notes: Development over time of 1st and 2nd dimension issues submitted as initiatives. Thin
lines represent alternative weighted polynomial regression lines. Dots in the background show
actual counts. The plot is based on all initiatives submitted between 1920 and 2011 that were
eventually voted on.
1960/1970s but thereafter accounts for more than half of all submitted initiatives.12 This plot
strongly supports the main argument that a large part of the observed increase in initiatives
is due to second-dimension issues.
After showing that electoral competition is strongly and significantly related to the number
of initiatives submitted and also that there is a large increase of second-dimension politics for
exactly the period in which there is a large increase of initiatives overall, there is one question
remaining. Is it the change of dimensionality that increases electoral competition and opens
avenues for political parties to introduce wedge issues? Alternatively, it could also be that
electoral volatility coincidentally increases parallel to the emergence of the second dimension.
That is to say that the relationship between electoral competition and initiative frequency
could be spurious. But if the argument of this paper holds, one should see that party involve-
ment in initiatives increases - the initiative frequency surges because politicians strategically
use the initiative to exploit new opportunities given by the fundamental changes unfolding
after the post-materialist revolution. To shed light on these aspects the next subsection looks
at who has submitted these initiatives.
12In Figure 3 of the online appendix the same plot is shown with the addition of institutional questions.
After WWII almost no broad institutional questions were brought up in initiatives anymore.
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4.3 Empirical Implications II: Origin of Initiatives
A second implication is that we should be able to observe that a large portion of the initiatives
are actually submitted by politicians and political parties rather than civil society groups and
local ad hoc issue committees. The quantitative evidence so far has shown that when political
competition increases, the number of initiatives submitted grows. If the causal mechanism
is competition driving parties to increasingly rely on the initiative to engage in a constant
campaign, we should expect to see that over time the parties start using the initiative much
more frequently and that politicians are submitting them rather than civil society groups.
I examined every initiative that was submitted and voted on and coded its origin. An
initiative could either emerge from a civil society group (usually an ad hoc or non-partisan
issue group) or be submitted by politicians. Unlike Serdu¨lt and Welp (2012), who distinguish
between opposition and government parties, I have only identified whether an initiative was
launched by a national politician or a group of national politicians. The coding was created
based on the entries in Linder et al. (2010) and Sigg (1978). Whenever there was no clear
political origin, the federal report (Bundesblatt) was consulted, which often revealed the
names of all members of the committee who submitted the initiative.13 Initiatives launched
by committees that had national politicians as members were counted as having a political
origin. If the initiative was launched by local politicians who were members of neither the
national parliament nor the national party elite, it was coded as having a civil society origin.14
As an additional quality control, I also compared my codings to those presented in Serdu¨lt
and Welp (2012) and Rohner (2012). The coding is mostly identical with few differences.
Some differences emerge because Serdu¨lt and Welp (2012) rely on a more legalistic or formal
definition of political origin. These two authors, for example, code an initiative from the
communication workers’ union as being a civil society project despite the fact that more
than two-thirds of the committee that drafted the initiative and submitted it are national
legislators.15 Another motivation for this coding is that even if a formally nonpartisan group,
e.g. a union, launches an initiative, this might very well be with the implicit backing of a party
or factions of a party. It becomes possible to separate originators who might have electoral
13See online appendix (A7) for an example of such an entry.
14A list of members of the lower chamber of Switzerland can be found here: http://www.parlament.ch/d/
suche/seiten/ratsmitglieder.aspx?export=excel.
15The Postal services for all initiative had twelve active or former members of parliament in the committee
(more than two thirds). Unlike Serdu¨lt and Welp (2012) I code this initiative as having a political origin.
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goals from those who have none. This coding also allows us to see how many initiatives can
be counted as bottom-up and how many are rather categorized as top-down.
The argument states that the increased competition leads parties and politicians to in-
creasingly use the initiative to further their electoral goals. So far it has been shown that as
political competition increases, so does the number of initiatives. Yet another derivation of
the argument implies that we should see that a large share of the initiatives were launched by
politicians.
Figure 3: Political Origin vs. Civil Society
Year
In
iti
at
iv
es
 a
nd
 T
he
ir 
O
rig
in
s
1920 1940 1960 1980 2000 2010
0
1
2
3
4
5
Parties and/or Politicians
Civil Society
Notes: Illustration of variation over time in number of initiatives originating from civil society
groups and initiatives with a political origin. Thin lines represent alternative weighted polynomial
regression lines. Plot is based on all initiatives submitted between 1920 and 2011 that were
eventually voted on.
Figure 3 shows the moving average of annually submitted initiatives by civil society groups
and politicians. The red line shows the average number of initiatives submitted by politicians
or political parties, while the blue line represents civil society groups. The number of initia-
tives that originate from the broader public slightly increases and contributes somewhat to
the overall surge in initiatives. But the largest driver in the increased number of initiative sub-
missions is found in political parties and politicians. There is a steady increase that accounts
for most of the submitted initiatives. Almost twice as many initiatives are being submitted
by politicians and political parties. This is in line with the theoretical argument that as new
issues emerge, parties and politicians will use direct democratic institutions to further their
electoral goals.
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4.4 Sudden Change or Steady Development?
At the outset, I showed that a univariate analysis of the initiative frequency identifies a first
break in the early 1920s and a clear break around 1970. One way of thinking about this
break is that there is some form of external shock, e.g. a fundamental change in values
that may affect the frequency of initiatives. But after establishing a model that relies on
electoral competition and signature requirements as explanatory variables, we can reevaluate
this structural break. Do we still find a basic shift of the data generating process when we use
a model with explanatory variables? The short answer is no. Once we use the explanatory
variables in a model, we do not find any structural breaks (see online appendix, A4).
The implication of this finding is that the frequency of initiatives develops in line with
electoral competition and signature requirements. While a first look at the data seems to
show a break - and many contemporary observers noted that break - it is wrong to assume
that something fundamental changed. Rather, the signature requirements and the political
competition changed and led in consequence to more initiatives. Hence, the increase of ini-
tiative usage did not occur suddenly as a qualitative change in the way parties behave but
rather steadily in response to the changing costs and incentives of using the institution. The
changing use of the initiative then follows nicely the overarching theme of this special issue
about larger changes in the political system (see, in particular, Wasserfallen, 2015; Traber,
2015; Bochsler and Bousbah, 2015; Bailer and Bu¨tikofer, 2015).
4.5 Summarizing the Empirical Results
The results indicate that initiative usage did not suddenly change but rather that there was
a gradual increase. This increase is partly due to its lowered cost which decreased further
with the growth in voting-eligible population. The second factor is the incentive for parties to
use the initiative to force wedge issues on the other parties. Hence, a strong predictor for the
number of initiatives to be submitted is the degree of partisan competition: as competition
increases, parties and politicians become more active and submit more initiatives. In the
1920s there was a higher usage than for the four decades thereafter, but that was also a time
of intense political competition as the parliament had just been elected for the first time by
proportional representation which led to severe changes in the partisan makeup. Neidhart has
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already claimed that the frequency of initiatives can be understood as the consequence of the
political cycle (politische Konjunktur ; Sigg, 1978, p.82).
The results show that the frequency of initiatives is a consequence of the larger political
landscape. As it becomes less costly to use initiatives, their frequency increases. Beyond
this somewhat mechanical factor there is also a second major factor driving the use of direct
democracy. Political competition increases the stakes, and politicians as well as political
parties will increasingly rely on initiatives as a means of constant campaigning.
5 Implications and Outlook
The previous sections provide the possibility to formulate some informed guesses on how the
number of initiatives will change in the near future. The two main driving forces are partisan
competition and signature requirements, whereas there is a significant but weak effect for
election years. The signature requirement has received a lot of attention in recent debates
and has even been the subject of a parliamentary motion. The next two sections provide
some reflection on what each factor is likely to contribute and how this would affect the
overall numbers of submitted initiatives.
5.1 Changing the Signature Requirement
While the empirical section in this paper shows a clear correlation, there is skepticism whether
this effect actually exists and whether a change of the signature requirements would lead
to fewer initiatives. An alternative approach is to exploit the signature variation in Swiss
cantons and rely on a cross-sectional design. When doing so a clear pattern emerges (see ??
for details). Regardless of the exact model specification – whether as linear regression, Poisson
model, or negative binomial count model – the signature requirement is always negatively and
significantly related to the number of initiatives. This is also good news for a large part of the
academic literature that uses the signature rules as proxy for the costs of using the initiative
(Stutzer, 1999).16 Where a lower percentage of the eligible citizenry has to sign in order for
an initiative to be put to a vote, we observe more initiatives.
16To be clear, the cost of using the referendum should not necessarily be related to the number of referendums
we see. The reason for this is that in the strategic interaction between parliamentary majority and minority
the costs are anticipated (see e.g. Hug, 2004). But with the initiative the strategic interaction is likely to
unfold only after it has been launched, and hence the costs are not part of the strategic interaction.
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To illustrate the size of the effect, we can look at the number of expected initiatives in
2011 while first using the actual signature requirement and then creating a prediction using
the signature requirement as it was in 1920 (about 5.2% of the voting-eligible population).
This is equivalent to asking what would happen if one required about 267,000 signatures
for an initiative in 2011. In 2011, eight initiatives were submitted, and the model predicts
7.74 initiatives. Once we change the signature requirement to the hypothetical value, we
estimate an expected value of 2.1 submitted initiatives. The substantive effect of the signature
requirement is strong.
Two cautionary remarks are in order. First, the effect in the national data (about 1.75
initiatives per 1% signature requirement increase) over time is almost twice as large as that
found in the cantonal data (about 0.95 initiatives per 1% signature requirement increase). A
second point is that given the prevalence of partisan initiatives nowadays, there is no reason
to expect parties not to adapt and spend more money on collecting signatures. It is important
to note that the simple statistical model from Table 1 does not take into account the changing
nature of proposers and hence limits its predictive abilities. Taken together, an increase in
the signature requirement most likely lowers the number of initiatives, but to a lesser extent
than suggested by the statistical model.
5.2 Political Competition: Inherent Instability
What is the impact of political competition? To see this effect, we can make a prediction
for 2011 and then repeat the prediction step but assume there are low electoral competition
levels. Post-war Swiss elections were marked by stability, and we include the competition
measure based on the elections in 1955. Again, the model prediction for 2011 with real values
is 7.74 initiatives, and once we change the electoral competition to the lowest value in the
sample, we find a predicted value of 3.2 initiatives. Electoral competition displays a clear and
substantively significant effect.
But how likely is it that electoral competition would return to post-war values? Social
choice theory actually points to the opposite – we should not expect this struggle over salience
to change very quickly. In principle, the McKelvey chaos theorem shows that there is no
policy outcome in a two-dimensional space that is a Condorcet winner (McKelvey, 1976).
The struggle over relative dimensional salience is not the same but shares a common feature
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with the chaos theorem: Under most circumstances there will be an actor who has an incentive
to change the relative saliency of the dimensions, and hence no stability can be expected.
As long as there is a party that gains from higher salience in one dimension while another
prefers prefers higher salience in another dimension, no change is likely. But even if the
political space fundamentally changed and could be described as a one-dimensional space, one
should not expect a significant change in the number of submitted initiatives. The reason for
this is that as long as parties have potential followers that overlap on a dimension, there is an
incentive to propose wedge issues that put a party leadership on the wrong side of a debate.
It is no coincidence that the populist right-wing party in Switzerland relied extensively on
questions pertaining to the relationship with the EU and immigration - on both those topics
their immediate competitors (the Conservatives and the Liberals) held positions that were
not fully backed by their supporters.
As long as the political competition remains at current levels, one cannot expect any
change. This competition is also not likely to change given the two-dimensional policy space
since political entrepreneurs should always be able to find new issues that will lead to dealign-
ment.
6 Conclusion
This paper asks how the frequency of initiatives can be explained. The late 1960s and 1970s
mark a period for most Western countries during which fundamental changes in values and
political attitudes took place. Such structural changes gave rise to political opportunities,
and there were political actors who seized the moment. The initiative offered a very potent
instrument to such actors by guaranteeing a public debate and press coverage.
In this sense, this institution increases contestation and democratizes the subjects that
are up for debate (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). The empirical case I analyze is the use of
initiatives at the national level in Switzerland since 1920. The initiative is being increasingly
used, and at least since the 1970s there is an ongoing discussion on whether this instrument
is being overused. I analyze annual submissions and the content of the launched initiatives
and identify the actor or actors behind these projects. I show that the increase is due to
two factors; first, the cost of launching an initiative has constantly decreased and second, the
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party competition leads parties to try to increase the salience of different dimensions by way
of using initiatives.
The implications of this is that not only direct democratic institutions complement rep-
resentative systems in terms of citizen involvement but also that parties can strategically
use these institutions. This is especially visible for times of change, as we find in the post-
materialism wave of the 1970s. The presence of direct democratic institutions lowers the
agenda control of dominant partisan actors and thereby changes the content of the political
discussion and increases contestation. This paper shows that direct democratic institutions
directly affect not only policy outcomes but also the issues that are subject to political dis-
cussions and conflicts.
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